Published by BusinessToday, image by BusinessToday.
Malaysia’s 5G rollout has indeed finally acquired something its original architects appeared firmly determined to avoid: an alternative. U Mobile has built its own network, Telekom Malaysia has moved its wholesale business across, and Digital Nasional Berhad (DNB) is being repositioned around operator ownership, longer-term financing and greater spectrum certainty. At last, after years of unnecessary detours, there is some movement toward a more credible industry structure that deserves acknowledgement.
But acknowledgement should not become another exemption from scrutiny. The central question remains: is Malaysia correcting the economic design that created its difficulties, or merely rearranging the ownership and financing around it while continuing to squeeze money out of spectrum, whose use should be maximized for the benefit of the Malaysian people?
Since 2021, EMIR Research has consistently argued that the choice of rollout model matters because it determines who can invest, innovate, control network quality and respond to customers. Changing the number of wholesale networks does not automatically settle those questions. Neither does changing their shareholders.
Consider TM’s migration to U Mobile. This is an observable consequence of wholesale competition: an operator has evaluated an alternative and chosen it. This commercial discipline was absent when every access seeker faced the same supplier. A second network has therefore created a meaningful possibility that the original Single Wholesale Network (SWN) deliberately excluded.
Yet the transition also exposes the cost of escaping the old arrangement. In its first-half 2026 financial report, TM disclosed a RM127.3 million write-down of unutilized prepaid capacity following its notice to terminate DNB’s access agreement. TM subsequently confirmed that it had vacated DNB’s capacity by 31 July, while acknowledging DNB’s differing view on the termination.
This deserves considerably more attention than another coverage celebration. If competition is to discipline wholesale providers, access seekers must be able to act on better offers without disproportionate switching costs. Otherwise, the freedom to choose exists alongside financial commitments that make exercising it expensive.
The published commercial terms warrant equally close examination. U Mobile’s January 2026 Reference Access Offer (RAO) retains capacity-based charging, with only a modest difference in the initial-tier rate compared with DNB’s published offer: RM28,000 per Gbps monthly for its initial tier and RM22,000 above 800 Gbps. DNB’s published 2022 offer, still linked from its website, lists RM30,000 and RM22,000 respectively, with a different tier threshold.
These of course are published reference terms, not proof of what individual operators have possibly negotiated. Indeed, U Mobile’s standard eMBB (enhanced Mobile Broadband) offer specifies a ten-year minimum term, whereas its announced TM agreement runs for three years. However, policymakers must establish whether effective wholesale prices, commitments and exit provisions now indeed support vigorous competition, rather than merely provide two versions of essentially similar contractual dependence.
EMIR Research’s earlier concern about wholesale economics therefore still remains pertinent (“Spectrum Economics & Deadweight Loss”, 15 March 2023). The relevant test is how charging structures influence investment and efficient capacity use, and whether cost reductions reach the end consumers. Wholesale choice should produce measurable commercial benefits. Its mere existence cannot be the final performance indicator.
Meanwhile, DNB’s financial transition has obviously become more substantial than the earlier stated approximately RM984 million associated with the Ministry of Finance Incorporated’s put option. In April, Maxis disclosed an additional RM202 million shareholder advance, with corresponding contributions from CelcomDigi and YTL bringing the additional funding to RM606 million.
On October 1, 2026, DNB announced RM5.2 billion in syndicated Islamic financing, including refinancing its government-guaranteed revolving credit facility. Maxis’s latest quarterly report also discloses shareholder undertakings to fund proportionate shortfalls in DNB’s scheduled debt payments under that financing and a separate RM330 million facility.
Although these commitments do not in themselves establish that shortfalls have occurred, they do make the allocation of risk a public-interest question deserving precise answers. Who now carries which obligations, on what terms, and with what implications for future network investment?
There is an important consistency here. EMIR Research advocated operator takeover and the reuse of existing infrastructure as elements of a credible transition (“Credible Way Forward”, 17 April 2023). However, it is obvious that such responsibility must come with the authority and commercial freedom to improve the underlying economics. A takeover that preserves inefficiencies would defeat its own rationale.
DNB’s October 2026 announcement still described Minister of Finance Incorporated’s (MoF Inc.) exit as an ordinary shareholder as planned, while confirming that the government would retain a special share. Ownership transfer, repayment, refinancing and the removal of public exposure are distinct matters. They should be reported distinctly, with sufficient disclosure to establish what has actually changed as well as what exactly “special share” entails. EMIR Research has previously warned about serious governance risks at DNB. Therefore, special share’s powers—and limits—deserve explicit scrutiny.
Operationally, there is some progress worth examining more thoroughly rather than dismissing. U Mobile reported 90% coverage of populated areas (COPA) in October 2026 and more than 250 in-building coverage sites. DNB has obtained additional mid-band spectrum and longer-term spectrum certainty, while CelcomDigi explicitly anticipates using existing shareholder infrastructure to improve efficiency and accelerate indoor deployment.
This is where the Input–Output–Outcome–Impact (IOOI) framework, consistently advocated by EMIR Research as the cornerstone of credible policymaking, matters: investment must translate into network provision, network provision into dependable connectivity and actual use, and these into lasting gains in productivity and people’s wellbeing. COPA is an output, and reporting the percentage is no substitute for transparently disclosing how it is calculated and verified in the Malaysian context; dependable connectivity and the actual take-up rate are the outcomes. Published performance comparisons must also respect their measurement periods. Results collected before U Mobile completed its departure from DNB cannot cleanly establish the relative performance of two fully separated networks. Independent, comparable post-transition evidence with clear definitions is now essential. Is the network dependable? Are speeds consistent? Is indoor coverage adequate?
Regulation has also moved. The revised Access List, effective from August 2026, introduces access to in-building mobile systems and dark fiber in specified circumstances. This to some extent addresses infrastructure bottlenecks repeatedly highlighted by EMIR Research. Nevertheless, regulated dark-fiber access remains geographically and structurally limited, rather than the comprehensive opening of backhaul needed to support competition wherever duplication is impractical (“Malaysian 5G Rollout: Digital Divide Whitewash”, 27 February 2023).
What, then, would constitute a completed correction? Certainly not the proposition that every operator must duplicate every tower or fiber route. EMIR Research has repeatedly distinguished sharing infrastructure that lowers common costs from arrangements that suppress the ability to compete on network quality. It is precisely the deliberately created confusion between these two questions that helped sustain the original controversy. There is little excuse for repeating that confusion now.
Nor should financial certainty for lenders be mistaken for commercial success for the nation. Financing provides the means to continue. Whether the resulting network can support affordable services, productive enterprise applications and sustained reinvestment remains a separate question, answerable through disclosed results. The rakyat should not have to reconstruct that answer from announcements celebrating each successive financing milestone.
The next phase should therefore be judged against clear public commitments: independently measured indoor and busy-hour performance; transparent wholesale access and switching conditions; disclosed financial obligations; and demonstrable savings from infrastructure reuse. Importantly, rural backhaul must remain part of that assessment, rather than disappear behind national coverage percentages.
Malaysia has already spent years debating institutional arrangements that should have served connectivity, not consumed the policy agenda. There is no virtue in refusing to recognize a correction when parts of it finally arrive. Equally, there is no wisdom in declaring the problem resolved because financing has been secured and another network switched on. The government must now ensure that the freedom to compete indeed becomes an enforceable reality, and that every further ringgit committed can be connected to a better outcome for the rakyat rather than for entrenched ruling-politico-corporate interests.
Dr Rais Hussin is the President / CEO of EMIR Research, a think tank focused on strategic policy recommendations based on rigorous research.
